RSPA Actions Taken in Response to the Olympic Pipeline Accident in Bellingham, Washington
(August 7, 2001):

In the wake of the Bellingham, Washington accident on June 10, 1999, PHMSA has taken the following actions:

June 11, 1999, initial response by PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) personnel. Subsequently dispatched four investigators to the site to assist in the incident response and accident investigation. PHMSA investigators are closely collaborating with the NTSB to determine the cause of the accident, and identify any pipeline safety violations.

June 18, 1999, PHMSA issued a corrective action order (CAO) to Olympic. The order requires Olympic to conduct tests and evaluations, as well as make hardware improvements, e.g. valves, SCADA, before the pipeline can be put back into service. PHMSA will not allow the pipeline to return to service until all safety issues are adequately addressed.

July 7, 1999, PHMSA issued an alert notice to the pipeline industry regarding potential SCADA problems that may affect their pipeline system. The alert notice was based on early accident findings which identified improper SCADA performance as a major contributor to the Bellingham accident. Similar SCADA-related occurrences on other pipeline facilities were subsequently identified, thereby resulting in our industry wide advisory.

July 23, 1999, PHMSA retained a third party, nationally recognized analyst to review the internal inspection logs to independently assess anomalies identified on the Olympic pipeline system.

August 10, 1999, PHMSA issued an amended corrective action order. The amendment requires Olympic to report all anomalies with their SCADA system for a period of one (1) year; within 3 months, develop and implement a training program for controllers specific to the SCADA system in use and review the qualifications of each controller to perform his/her job; perform a design review of then Ferndale to Allen segment to insure that station safety devises will shut down the segment within applicable parameters including performing a worst case surge analysis, testing all relief valves for reliable operation, and performing a design review of the Bayview Products Terminal; after running any internal inspection devices, excavate and examine any anomaly identified in the top half of the pipe and take remedial action with respect to each; consider the possibility of internal corrosion in reviewing results of internal inspection device surveys; review existing procedures for normal, abnormal, and emergency operations of the Ferndale to Allen segment and make any necessary changes to ensure that they address operations at the Bayview Products Terminal.

August 15, 1999, PHMSA stationed permanent pipeline inspector in Olympia, Washington.

September 19 - 25, 1999, Olympic hydrostatically tested the 16-inch pipeline through the City of Bellingham. One failure occurred on pre-1970 ERW pipe manufactured by Lone Star.

September 24, 1999, PHMSA issued a second amended corrective action order. Required Olympic to drop operating pressures in entire system to 80% MOP, conduct hydrotest of Ferndale to Allen & all pre-1970 low frequency ERW pipe, conduct internal inspections, and report findings of management audit within 6 months of completion.

October 8 - 29, 1999, Olympic hydrostatically tested the 16-inch Ferndale to Allen pipeline segment from Milepost 0 - 12 and Milepost 22 - 40.

January 14, 2000, Olympic requests permission to re-start the 16-inch Ferndale to Allen pipeline segment.

January 26, 2000, PHMSA correspondence to Olympic requesting implementation plans for Valve Study and In-line Inspection Surveys.

March 9, 2000, PHMSA correspondence concerning inadequacies and omissions in Olympic's implementation plans & procedures for re-start of the 16-inch Ferndale to Allen pipeline segment.

Spring of 2000, Olympic completed the mandated corrective actions for enhanced valve placement, SCADA enhancements, controller training, and overpressure protection.

June 2, 2000, PHMSA proposed a $3.05 million civil penalty against Olympic Pipeline, for safety violations related to the June 10, 1999 pipeline failure. Each of the penalties proposed carries the maximum fine allowed under current pipeline safety law.

June 8, 2000, PHMSA announced a partnership between the State of Washington and the Office of Pipeline Safety that will allow Washington State pipeline safety inspectors to participate in inspections of interstate pipeline facilities.

July 1, 2000, the operation of the Olympic Pipeline was transferred from Equilon to British Petroleum (BP).

August 3, 2000, Olympic completed the Geometry and High Resolution Magnetic Flux Leakage surveys for the entire pipeline system.

August 4, 2000, PHMSA tentatively accepted proposed integrity management actions by BP Amoco, owner of Olympic Pipe Line, to further ensure the safety of their pipeline system in the State of Washington. In addition to conducting hydrostatic testing of the 16-inch pipeline from Allen to Renton, Washington, the company plans to use the state-of-the-art transverse field inspection tool to identify seam-weld and other potential longitudinal defects on their entire 400-mile pipeline system.

August 8, 2000, PHMSA held a public meeting in Bellingham. The meeting gave the public an opportunity to learn more about the results of the internal inspection tests taking place on the 16-inch pipeline from Ferndale to Allen and other completed mandated safety improvements.

August 18, 2000, Olympic completed replacement of the portion of the pipeline adjacent to the Kulsham Middle School in the City of Bellingham, Washington.

August 25, 2000, PHMSA's correspondence to Olympic, stating prior to allowing resumed operation at reduced pressure of the shutdown 16-inch pipeline segment, OPS needs added assurance the management, procedural, and organizational issues playing a role in the accident have been adequately resolved. The company was provided with a list of key issues to be reviewed by OPS as part of the management audit.

October 31, 2000, PHMSA's correspondence approving the final excavation list, evaluation and repair criteria for the Olympic 16-inch Pipeline.

November 9, 2000, OPS conducted a review of management, procedural, and organizational issues playing a role in the accident. The review provided OPS with additional assurances necessary regarding BP's operation of the Olympic Pipe Line System.

November 28, 2000, Repairs complete for the Cherry Point to Allen segment of 16-inch pipeline. OPS and WUTC personnel continuously monitored evaluation and repair activities for this pipeline segment from May through November of 2000.

December 5, 2000, Repairs complete for the Anacortes to Allen segment of 16-inch pipeline.

December 7, 2000, PHMSA's correspondence granting Olympic permission to purge the 16-inch Cherry Point to Allen pipeline segment with nitrogen. The nitrogen purge removed residual diesel from ILI activities and oxygen from repair activities eliminating the possibility of a combustible atmosphere forming within the pipeline. The nitrogen purge also provided for a low pressure leak test of the pipeline's integrity.

January 25, 2001, PHMSA's correspondence to Olympic allowing introduction of product into the Cherry Point to Ferndale and Ferndale to Allen pipeline segments.

February 7, 2001, PHMSA's correspondence to Olympic allowing limited operation of the Cherry Point to Ferndale and Ferndale to Allen pipeline segments.

February 8, 2001, Olympic resumed limited operation of the Cherry Point to Allen segment of pipeline. This segment had not been operated, except for ILI surveys, since the June 10, 1999, incident in Bellingham, Washington. Prior to and during the restart of the pipeline segment OPS and WUTC personnel reviewed procedures and observed pipeline operations assuring the operating integrity of the pipeline system.

May 16, 2001, Olympic successfully completed the voluntary hydrostatic testing of the 16-inch Allen to Renton pipeline segment. The OPS and WUTC personnel observed the pressure testing of the pipeline segment and reviewed test documentation.

June 3, 2001, Olympic resumed limited operation of the 16-inch Allen to Renton pipeline segment. This segment had not been operated, except for ILI surveys, since the June 10, 1999, incident in Bellingham, Washington. Prior to and during the restart of the pipeline segment OPS and WUTC personnel reviewed procedures and observed pipeline operations assuring the operating integrity of the pipeline system.

June 2001 to Present, OPS and WUTC continue observing the evaluation and repairs of the Allen to Renton 16-inch pipeline segment. Two sites, due to permitting constraints, remain to be evaluated on the 16-inch pipeline segment. The two sites have been successfully pressure tested and the pipeline's operating pressure remains restricted. OPS and WUTC continue to monitor evaluation and repair activities associated with the other pipeline segments voluntarily surveyed by BP.

LAST UPDATE 08/07/2001